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PROJECT OF DEMOCRACY
The Project 
of Democracy
by Alexander Keyssar
This article presents the second of two addresses given at the
May 2002 Maine Town Meeting sponsored by the
Margaret Chase Smith Library in Skowhegan. Keyssar, an
historian at Harvard University, chronicles the advances
and contractions of democratic political rights in American
history. While on balance, this is a story of progress, it is
not, Keyssar argues, unilinear, nor one that is completed.
Although arguably late for the world’s “greatest democracy,”
by the 1970s the United States had achieved universal
suffrage. Today, however, the tug between democratic and
anti-democratic forces continues. The contest is no longer
over voting rights but over the procedures and rules
governing elections (i.e., election reform and redistricting).
Keyssar argues we must continue to fight for the expansion
of democratic rights; it is an ongoing project, one in which
we will never be finished.  
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Let me begin by recounting a largely unknown storyabout politics and the right to vote in the state 
of Maine. In the fall of 1932—during the election
campaign between Franklin Roosevelt and Herbert
Hoover—the registrar of voting in Lewiston, Maine,
who was a Republican, announced that anybody
receiving unemployment relief in Lewiston would be
disfranchised. This was followed by similar actions in
Waterville and a number of other towns. The legal
grounds for this decision was a nineteenth-century law,
which prohibited paupers (anyone dependent on the
public for support) from voting. As a result, thousands
of Maine residents were deprived of their franchise,
including hundreds in Lewiston and Waterville.
Perhaps not surprisingly, these actions produced 
a substantial national uproar during the height of the
most severe depression in American history and, for
Republicans in Maine, the issue may have backfired,
because for the first time in a very long time the state
voted Democratic in the presidential election.
In part, I recount this story as a reminder that
democratic institutions were long limited in the United
States, even in recent history: poor people were some-
times kept from voting not just in the South, but in
Maine and other northern states. Literacy tests existed
not only in Mississippi but in New York, where
hundreds of thousands of Spanish-speaking citizens,
who could not pass an English literacy test, were disen-
franchised as late as the 1960s.
I also mention the attempt in Maine in the 1930s
because I think today we are living during a time when
there are more uncertainties and trepidations about the
nature of our democracy than at any point since the
Great Depression. Indeed, the crisis that presented itself
in the United States was primarily economic. At that
time there were many citizens of the Western world—
probably a majority—who were not sure that capi-
talism and democracy could both survive, or at the 
very least, survive together. “You can’t cure a disease 
by popular vote,” a common expression of the time,
was reflective of this pessimism.
Today our discomfort has a different set of
sources. On the one hand, we are feeling threatened by
international adversaries that seem shadowy, lethal, and
deeply rooted in societies we don’t fully understand.
Although the acute vulnerability
that was occasioned by the events
of September 11 has receded, a
lingering nervousness remains
and a sense of horror and vulner-
ability may well return. 
At the same time, and 
even as we stand united against 
a common adversary, we are,
thanks in part to the bizarre elec-
tion of the year 2000, acutely
aware of the limits and some of
the shortcomings of American
democracy. No less an expert
than the ubiquitous Jimmy Carter
reported that the Mexican elections of 2000 were
substantially better run than ours in the United States.
Indeed, most of us have an uneasy awareness that
we are not quite the model “city on the hill” our public
officials depict. We know that our government is led 
by a president who received fewer votes than his adver-
sary, that, in 2000, half of the electorate did not vote,
two-thirds of the poor did not vote, and that the
contours of recent election campaigns—indeed, the
contours of political life itself—have been shaped by
the imperatives of fund-raising done from the wealthy. 
With this in mind, I would like to talk about what
I have come to call the “project of democracy,” a way
of understanding and thinking about democracy, and 
a way of thinking about the challenge we now face. 
ELECTION 2000
Let me begin with some of the conclusions that canbe drawn from Election 2000 and its immediate
aftermath. First, whatever you used to think, you do
not have a constitutional right to vote in presidential
elections—or any federal elections, for that matter. 
As the Supreme Court made very clear in Bush v. Gore,
state legislatures have the right to choose how their
state’s presidential electors will be selected, and they
can cut the electorate out of the deal altogether. There
is no requirement of a popular vote for the presidency.
Second, the principle of one person/one vote,
which we think of as fundamental to democracy, does
…democratic
institutions were
long limited in the
United States, even
in recent history…
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not apply in presidential elections. Thanks to the 
structure of the electoral college, a single electoral 
vote in a populous state such as California or New
York represents roughly 500,000 people—or it did 
in the last election—while in the smallest states, it
represents only 220,000. 
The third lesson is that if you registered to vote,
your name may or may not appear on registration lists,
and you may or may not be able to cast a provisional
ballot, depending on the state in which you live and
the helpfulness of local officials.
Fourth, if turnout in an election was ever really
high—for instance, if it was ever at a level that is
common in most other industrial democracies, such as,
say, 75%—we would still be in line waiting to vote in
Election 2000.
Also, if you vote, your vote will probably be
counted, but maybe not. Millions of ballots will be
tossed out because of improper markings and machine
malfunctions. Furthermore, if you are black, the odds
that your vote will be tossed out are four to 10 times
greater than if you are white.
If you are poor or have only a high school 
education or less, the odds that you will vote at all 
are less than half of that for people who are wealthy 
or well educated. 
And finally, if for whatever reason, you are
deprived of the right to vote—or your vote is not
being counted—you can trust that one of the major
political parties will help you only if its leaders are
convinced they will benefit by doing so. In such 
an event, the other major party will oppose your re-
enfranchisement because the mistake was yours, you
can’t prove otherwise, the letter of the law must be
followed, and besides, it’s too late to count your vote
anyway. Each of the two major parties deeply believes
in the right to vote of its own supporters, and they
agree that third parties should be abolished except
possibly for those third parties that will drain votes
from their adversaries.
Now, none of these unfortunate lessons was an
accident. The unusual, accidental dimension of Election
2000 was that the election was so close that all these
features of political life were revealed and were treated
as significant by the press. But the basic dynamics
leading to these deformations of political life have 
deep roots in American history.
Indeed, one could reasonably say that the road 
to Tallahassee began in Philadelphia in 1787, and it 
is for this reason that I will now lead you on a histor-
ical journey.
1789 THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 
Ibegin with what I have come to call the original sinof our Constitution, which was that the founding
fathers, coming together to write a national constitution
for one nation comprised of 13 states, each a former
colony with its own traditions and suffrage laws, chose
not to adopt a uniform national franchise or any kind
of uniform law dealing with the right to vote. In fact,
what they chose to do was to separate citizenship in
the United States from the right to vote, and to make
citizenship a federal matter and the right to vote a state
matter. They left the entire issue up to the states, except
for a small linkage of the right to vote to the House 
of Representatives. They did this not because of any
principle or rationale, but rather for short-term political
reasons of their own. They were concerned that any
national rule would antagonize some states (or others)
and thus jeopardize passage of the Constitution. 
The franchise was left to the states, which had a
wide variety of laws. The most common were property
or taxpaying requirements. You either had to have
owned property or paid taxes. Every state but Vermont
had a requirement of this type, and it constituted an
explicit class barrier to participation in political life.
The most vociferous opponent of property require-
ments was Benjamin Franklin, the oldest delegate.
Franklin suggested that all adult males should vote, 
…the founding fathers…chose not to
adopt…any kind of uniform law dealing
with the right to vote.
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but as a matter of fairness and in the interests of what
we would now call “national security.” He thought 
that it would be easier to raise an army and retain 
the loyalty of soldiers if all, even the poor, could vote.
There was also a story that Franklin frequently told,
which is outlined below. (One necessary piece of back-
ground to this story is that potential voters in many
states could meet property requirements by owning
farm animals, which were of substantial value.)
Today a man owns a jackass worth $50 and he is
entitled to vote; but before the next election the
jackass dies. The man in the mean time has become
more experienced, his knowledge of the principles of
government, and his acquaintance with mankind, are
more extensive, and he is therefore better qualified to
make a proper selection of rulers—but the jackass is
dead and the man cannot vote. Now gentlemen, pray
inform me, in whom is the right of suffrage? In the
man or in the jackass?
The story is so well known that debates in state
constitutional conventions 50 years later (i.e., in the
1840s) contained references to Franklin’s jackass. But
Franklin’s was nevertheless a minority view at the end
of the eighteenth century. In the 200 years since ratifi-
cation of the constitution, a great deal changed, though
these changes never moved in a simple, straight line.
From 1790 to 1850, there was a gradual repeal 
of property and taxpaying requirements throughout 
the United States. This was prompted, in part, by
campaigns waged by soldiers in the Revolutionary 
War and the War of 1812 who stated that if we
wanted them to fight, we should enfranchise them—
not an unreasonable proposition. Generally, this was 
an era of expansion and, in numerous states, even non-
citizens were given the right to vote if they lived in 
the United States for two years and if they intended 
to become citizens.
At the same time there were movements in oppo-
site directions. One notable example is that women
were enfranchised in New Jersey at the end of the
eighteenth century but lost the right to vote in 1807.
New Jersey was unique in its willingness to disfranchise
people not by constitutional alterations, but by statute
law; the same act that deprived women of the vote 
also disfranchised African Americans. Indeed, in several
northern states, blacks who could vote in 1800 found
themselves disenfranchised by 1840.
As political historians have long noted, the United
States is unusual in relaxing formal class barriers to the
franchise in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Still, a key factor that has not received adequate atten-
tion is that the nation did so at a time when neither 
the industrial working class nor the peasantry—the 
two classes most feared as political participants in other
parts of the world—posed a threat in the United States.
This was so for precise reasons. 
First, in the North, the laws eliminating property
requirements were passed before individual states were
industrialized. There are fascinating debates one can
read, beginning with the New York constitutional
convention of 1820-1821, where advocates explain
their support for such laws. They say, “Look, we want
this [law] to enfranchise some farmers who own smaller
farms, the artisans who own their shops, people who
have mortgages who otherwise would not qualify. 
We are not talking about enfranchising any kind of
working class or industrial working class.” Indeed, the
chief advocate of reform says: “I am advocating this
because I am convinced that New York will remain a
predominantly agricultural society for the next 1,000
years. If I thought otherwise, I would never favor drop-
ping the property requirement.” 
The great counter example to this chronology 
is the state of Rhode Island, which did not reform its
colonial suffrage laws at independence. It retained a
property requirement even after it was industrialized.
By 1830, when the question of universal suffrage
showed up on the agenda of Rhode Island politics, 
the number of textile workers outnumbered the
number of farmers by two-to-one. Not surprisingly,
the farmers resisted. The result in Rhode Island, over 
a period of about 20 years, was a conflict called the
Dorr War, although actual armed conflict was minimal.
It included a brief period when two groups claimed 
to be legitimate governments, and two separate 
elections were held. Through the 1830s and 1840s
Rhode Island was the focus of national attention, 
and it illustrates, I think, what would have happened
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had there been an industrial working class at the
moment of suffrage expansion.
The second issue is that the American equivalent
of a peasantry—the analogue to what was going on 
in Europe—was black and enslaved. When North
Carolina and Virginia decided to get rid of their prop-
erty requirements, it never occurred to the people
involved in those decisions that this might result in
enfranchising black people who were working the land.
They were enfranchising poor whites (in part to make a
union against blacks), not the nation’s African-American
equivalent of a peasantry. 
The period of expansion of the franchise culmi-
nates during or just after the Civil War with passage 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, which,
officially—but only briefly in the South—enfranchised
African Americans. Then, there was a long and, until
recently, little understood period of contraction of the
right to vote (and of democratic rights in general) that
lasted, I argue, from Reconstruction to World War I.
This was true in the North as well as in the South. 
RECONSTRUCTION TO WORLD WAR I
In the South, the story is well known. Depending on the state, after a period of 10, 15, or 20 years in
which African Americans participated in politics, they
were stripped of those rights by a mixture of force and
law. As a rule, force preceded changes in the laws—
since force, however effective, generated a great deal of
unwelcome national publicity and ran the risk of poten-
tially leading to the reintroduction of northern troops in
the South. One state after another, thus, introduced
literacy tests, poll taxes, and other devices to circumvent
the Fifteenth Amendment. After the Republican party
had been destroyed in the South, leaving a situation in
which the only elections that counted were within the
Democratic party, the white primary was adopted—a
very efficient means of keeping blacks disenfranchised.
Democrats maintained that the Fifteenth Amendment
did not apply to primaries because political parties were
akin to private clubs. The Supreme Court upheld vari-
ants of this position until 1944.
What is less well known is that similar things
happened in the North, although not on the same 
scale as was seen in the South. For example, the first
grandfather clause was not written in South Carolina 
or Mississippi, but in Massachusetts. It applied to a
Massachusetts English language literacy test that was
passed in the 1850s. Massachusetts also briefly passed a
law that said if you were foreign-born, you had to wait
several years after naturalization in order to vote. Maine
passed an English language literacy test in the 1890s,
as did New Hampshire 10 years later. Rhode Island
had a property requirement for foreign-born citizens 
in statewide elections until the 1880s, and in city elec-
tions until the 1930s. If you were native-born, you
didn’t have any property requirements, but if you were
foreign-born, you did. 
Without going into tedious detail, these laws were
aimed at the immigrant working class and they
succeeded in limiting the size of the electorate. This
thrust toward contraction, which was aimed predomi-
nately at blacks and immigrants, also had the effect of
delaying the passage of women’s suffrage for an extra
20 to 30 years. Women’s suffrage was not passed until
the aftermath of World War I. Even during World 
War I, when it was promoted by Woodrow Wilson 
to Congress, woman’s suffrage was explicitly couched
as a measure to mobilize the wartime effort. 
WORLD WAR I THROUGH THE 1960S
The years between World War I and the 1960s werelargely ones of stasis with respect to the right to
vote. Legal changes were enacted in a variety of states,
but they did not alter the basic structures that were in
place by 1915. Perhaps the most significant of these
changes occurred during World War II, when the
Supreme Court struck down the white primary and
Congress voted to prohibit poll taxes on any soldiers
who were casting absentee ballots. Even the most die-
hard southern political leaders thought it would be
unseemly to tax men and women in uniform who were
fighting overseas.
Yet in the 1940s there began processes of social
and political change that would eventuate in the truly
dramatic evolution of voting rights that occurred in the
1960s. These processes were spurred in part by the
mobilization of armed forces veterans of World War II
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and the Korean War; many African-American, Hispanic,
and Native American veterans led the fight for enfran-
chisement. The spectacle of veterans wearing medals
awarded for valor being turned away from registrars’
offices, or even being beaten when they tried to vote,
drew national publicity.
Also spurring change was the transformation of
southern society occasioned by technological changes 
in agriculture that freed—or pushed—many African
Americans from the land. Some migrated to the North,
where they obtained voting rights and became a pres-
sure group for civil and voting rights nationwide; 
others moved to southern cities such as Birmingham,
Memphis, and Greensboro, where they became a part of
a growing, if decentralized, movement for equal rights.
Pressure to end the disenfranchisement of African
Americans in the South (as well as other minority
groups) also came from abroad—or, more precisely,
from the political dynamics of the Cold War. In the
rhetorical combat that accompanied that conflict, the
discrimination against African Americans in the United
States was a serious matter. While the State Department
and the White House were trying to enlist allies in
Africa and Asia, the Soviet Union was saying, “Look 
at the way they treat blacks in their own society.”
One critical upshot of these dynamics was the
passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965. In
essence, the VRA was simply legislation designed to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which had been on the
books for almost a century. Its passage transformed the
politics of the South and eventually the nation. Moreover,
the VRA was accompanied by a series of Supreme Court
decisions, constitutional amendments, and acts of
Congress that eliminated numerous barriers to voting. 
For example, the Supreme Court in 1966 declared
that wealth cannot be a criterion for voting; there could
no longer be any poll taxes or any type of property
requirement. As Justice William Douglas proclaimed,
wealth was not “germane” to the right to vote. This
decision marked the end of formal class barriers to
voting rights in the United States—a great deal later
than most people assume to have been the case.
Literacy tests were also thrown out and residency
requirements were shortened from two years in some
states to 30 or 45 days. To supplement the Fifteenth
Amendment (which focused on
race), the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment
was invoked to bar other forms 
of discrimination. Indeed, by 
the early 1970s it appeared as
though an expansive interpreta-
tion of the equal protection
clause would even lead to the
abolition of felon disenfranchise-
ment laws. The California
Supreme Court struck down that
state’s felon disenfranchisement
law for just such a reason.
But the Supreme Court 
of the United States overturned
the California court’s decision,
leaving the early 1970s as the
high watermark in the court’s
interpretation of voting rights.
The Supreme Court’s opinion,
written by then-Justice (and now
Chief Justice) Rehnquist, ruled
that felon disenfranchisement
laws were protected by the clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment
that tacitly permitted states to
disenfranchise men who had been convicted of “rebel-
lion and other crimes.”  Most historians believe that
this clause, written in 1868, was aimed entirely at
Confederate rebels and did not envisage disenfran-
chising people who had held up a gas station, but
Justice Rehnquist disagreed.
Nonetheless, one could say that by the 1970s 
the United States had achieved what one could 
meaningfully call universal suffrage—a bit late for 
the world’s  “greatest” democracy, but it did happen.
Ironically, perhaps, our Constitution remained 
(and remains) lacking any affirmative statement that
Americans have the right to vote. Our legal and
constitutional structure is an odd one in which consti-
tutional amendments and court decisions prohibit
states from discriminating (with respect to voting
rights) on a variety of grounds—without explicitly
guaranteeing anyone the right to vote.
…there was a
long…period of
contraction of the
right to vote…
that lasted…from
Reconstruction 
to World War I
…in the North 
as well as in 
the South.
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WHAT DOES THIS HISTORY TELL US?
This story is unbalanced, yet in the end, it is a storyof progress. However, I don’t think progress, which
is the story we live and grow up with in popular
culture, is the only thing we should draw from this
complex history. Let me suggest a few other ideas:
One that we should recognize is that the history
of suffrage and the history of democratic political
rights have been uneven histories. They have not been
unilinear. There have been advances and contractions.
At moments, our nation has been more democratic
and, at other moments, it has been less democratic.
There is a fragility of which you have to be aware.
Even fairly recently, in the 2000 Massachusetts’ elec-
tions, felons were disfranchised after 200 years of
having the right to vote.
The record reveals there have always been forces in
the United States that have opposed expansion of the
franchise. In a sense, the dirty little secret of American
political life is that not everyone believes in democracy,
although there is now a broad ideological presumption
in its favor. Throughout American history, there have
been some segments of the elite and the middle class,
and even some segments of the working class, that
have challenged or opposed the rights of poorer, less-
educated, racially or ethnically distinct groups to vote.
Our history also tells us that the major parties
generally have been complicit in denials of the right 
to vote; they have more often been partisan than princi-
pled. To be fair, there are many heroic stories of people
acting on principle. Passage of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth amendments resulted from such action. Still, 
if you look at the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, what you find, in broad strokes, is that the
Republican party stood as the main rhetorical and
political defender of black voting rights in the South,
while at the same time, Republicans in the North tried
to chip away at the voting rights of immigrant voters.
The position of the Democratic party was precisely the
opposite. It supported and tried to enroll immigrant
workers in the North and was adamantly opposed to
the enfranchisement of blacks in the South.
This dynamic has been an important component
of the partisanship of the parties. Especially in the late
nineteenth century, each party worked to gain control
over enfranchisement laws and also the procedural
rules that govern elections and the procedural appa-
ratus. Political professionals know that these rules—
the details of how you register, how you go
about voting, when you do what—win and
lose elections. Political parties do not exist 
to promote democracy, but rather to win
elections. That is their goal. Political profes-
sionals know that often the way you win an
election is not by maximizing turnout, but 
by maximizing the turnout of your own 
reliable voters and by minimizing the turnout
of anybody else. 
The election laws—as they exist in 
most states—are not written by non-partisan
commissions to try and create a fair electoral
process. Instead, they are the rules of engagement
between the two major parties who have gotten tired 
of unpredictable conflict and cheating. In a certain
sense, Katherine Harris is not a new figure on the 
political landscape, however pivotally she fulfilled her
historical role in 2000.
Importantly, one critical aspect of the rules
governing elections—many of which were put in place
in the late nineteenth century—has been to discourage
the appearance and success of third parties. The laws
that govern getting on the ballot favor the major parties
at the expense of innovative start-ups. It is notable 
that we live in a world at the beginning of the twenty-
first century where there is tremendous celebration of
freedom in the markets and in our economic life. At the
The election laws…in most states are not written
by non-partisan commissions to try and create 
a fair electoral process. …they are the rules 
of engagement between the two major parties…
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same time, our entire political leadership is absolutely
opposed to anything that looks like a free-market polit-
ical life. There is no consensus saying, “Let’s equalize
the playing fields for new political parties or new
groups.” In the United States, what we really have is 
an institutionalized political oligopoly.
This longer historical view suggests that contests
between democratic and anti-democratic forces will
continue, that they are permanent and recurring, and
that they go through different stages and can occupy
different arenas. In other words, even after universal
suffrage is achieved in a particular place and democratic
voting rights are extensive, the contest continues. Only
what they are fighting over shifts.
Today’s contest is no longer focused on the right
to vote per se. But it may become, as it did in the late
nineteenth century, about registration rules. In the
1880s, the New York State Legislature passed a law
stating that you had to have personal registration in 
the cities of New York, and that it also had to be
annual if you were in New York City—and New York
City alone. For a brief period in the early twentieth
century there were only about two days to register,
which tended to be Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah,
substantially limiting the Jewish vote. It is not unlikely
that control over registration rules could again become
an arena of contest.
Of course, in the South, we’ve seen since the
Voting Rights Act of 1970 that the contest is no
longer over enfranchisement; instead, it is over redis-
tricting. The national battle over campaign finance
reform is, of course, another arena in which the contest
is playing itself out. 
DEMOCRACY AS A “PROJECT”
All of this is to say that we ought to view democ-racy not as a fixed set of rules or exemptions, 
but as an ongoing and permanent project. Democracy
is a goal, and also something that we have to nurture
and revitalize all of the time. Certainly in capitalist
societies—and we have none other in the world 
right now—economic power will remain unequally
distributed, and there will be those who will resist 
the equalization of political power precisely because 
it threatens the inequalities that are inescapably 
generated in a market economy. 
Similarly—and perhaps more explosively in the
world today—ethnic, religious, and racial tensions 
too often give rise to an impulse to deprive those who
are different of their political rights, and a reluctance
to be governed by those who are seen as “others.” 
In any society, those who are in power are going to
try to remain in power; parties that dominate particular
cities, states, or regions will seek to continue their
dominance and often to create rules of politics in order
to do so. The project of democracy is the project of
opposing all of these anti-democratic steps, of taking
many steps, big and small, to try to ensure that all
voices are heard and that all carry equal weight.
Election 2000 forcefully reminded us of the impera-
tive of pursuing that project.
As we talk about this political project, I will say
that my own approach is to let 100 flowers bloom,
well beyond the reforms now in Congress. We need
more than new machines and provisional voting mech-
anisms. While these are good things, we need to dig
deeper. There has to be serious and ongoing campaign
finance reform. I think there should be a constitutional
amendment to guarantee the right to vote in general
elections, and a move toward proportional representa-
tion as a way of encouraging new political groups 
and revitalizing political life. My own view is that 
we ought to do everything we can to try to increase
participation in elections.
In this regard, let me mention one thing that has
to do with the remarkable class skew of contemporary
politics. It has to do with polling. As you know,
national campaigns are increasingly governed by polls.
That would be fine if you had a situation where your
pollsters were going out all over the country and ques-
tioning what issues are important to people. But the
fact is that even if they do poll a large sample, the
results they compile and give to candidates are not a
random cross section. The poll results they use are from
those called “most-likely voters.” How do pollsters
decide whether you are a likely voter? They use two
criteria: one is that you voted in the last election; the
other reflects your socioeconomic status and your level
of education. If you are poor and did not vote in the
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last election, the issues of
concern you raise are most
likely not reflected in the results
that are passed on to candidates
and political leaders.
This definition of likely
voter helps to explain why so
much of the 2000 Senate and
presidential elections seemed 
to be a national referendum on
which prescription drug plan
for senior citizens was prefer-
able. There was no talk about
health insurance for the 50
million people who don’t have
insurance. But senior citizens
are identified as likely voters.
Unfortunately, there is a
vicious cycle here. People who
are not considered likely voters
do not have their issues addressed. As a result they
don’t vote, which ensures that they are left out of the
next cycle of polling.
One way or another, we need to figure out a
variety of mechanisms to break those patterns and 
to pursue the democratic project, which began long
before Benjamin Franklin, and has been the pursuit of
hundreds of thousands of people throughout history.
Ironically, the aftermath of September 11 may
provide a rhetorical opening or reinforcement for this
project. If, on the one hand, we rightly fear a loss of
civil liberties during a prolonged era of semi-declared
war, we also must recognize that wars have often been
moments when our nation has been challenged, often
successfully, to live up to its own professed values. It
was the Civil War that brought about the enfranchise-
ment of blacks; it was World War I that brought about
the enfranchisement of women; and the Cold War
certainly played a significant role in promoting democ-
ratic rights in the South and key places in the West.
Of course, the current war on terror is not one 
of mass mobilization, not one in which we will likely
need to recruit millions of additional soldiers into the
armed forces, or mobilize tens of millions of civilians
into active support for a military venture, dynamics that
led to the expansion of democracy in the past.
If this war against terror continues—and there is
no reason to believe it won’t—it will demand sacrifices
of many of us. It is often when states demand sacrifices
that people demand an expansion of rights and power
in return. This is also a war of values and, as such, it
puts a not unwelcome pressure on us to live up to our
own professed values. There is a schizoid perception 
of the United States in much of the world. On the one
hand, there is recognition that the United States is a
remarkably open and democratic society. At the same
time, we are seen as something of an imperialistic bully.
To the extent there are imperfections in our own insti-
tutions, it may magnify that perception. As a contest
and competition of values, the war against terror thus
becomes a moment when we are called upon to live 
up to our deepest values. As important, if not more
important, our place in the world, and the precarious-
ness of the world, demands a vital politics. It demands
fresh debates, new ideas and new thinking within our
own political universe, and that will be far more likely
to occur if our system is invigorated by new currents,
new actors, and maximal political participation. 
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is pollyannaish to look at the rather grimworld situation and see it as an opportunity for
positive developments. Things may get worse before
they get better. Still, as an historian looking back over
time, it does seem things can be made better. What
happened in Florida in Election 2000 was not pretty; 
it was an ugly election. But 50 years ago, blacks would
not have been voting in Florida at all. Fifty years ago,
Puerto Ricans would not have been voting in New
York. Indeed, it has been less than 50 years since the
Supreme Court declared that wealth was “not germane
to voting,” and thus solemnly grounded the fact that, 
in American society, the right to vote belongs to the
man and not the jackass. 
It is often when
states demand
sacrifices that
people demand 
an expansion 
of rights and
power in return.
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